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RECENT DECISIONS

CoNsTITUTIONAL LAW-FEDERAL COURTS-CITIZENSHIP IN THE D1sTRICT OF COLUMBIA AS ,A BASIS FOR DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP UR!SDICTION

J

-Plaintiff, a District of Columbia corporation, sued defendant, a Nebraska
corporation, in the Municipal Court of Chicago, Illinois. Defendant removed
the case to a federal district court pursuant to the provisions of an amendment to
the judicial code extending the jurisdiction of the federal courts to suits and controversies between citizens of the District of Columbia and citizens of any state
or territory.1 From an adverse judgment defendant appealed, raising for the first
time in the case the question of constitutionality of the amendment conferring
jurisdiction. Held, the amendment is unconstitutional. Judge Evans dissented. 2
Central States Cooperatives, Inc. v. Watson Brothers Transportation Co., Inc.
(C.C.A. 7th, 1947).
The majority concluded that the outer limits of federal jurisdiction are prescribed by Article III, section 2,3 which extends jurisdiction in diversity cases
., only to suits between citizens of different states. The court then concluded that
the amendment is invalid, inasmuch as a citizen of the District of Columbia is
not a citizen of a state. Six of the eight courts which have passed on the amendmenf have agreed with the majority,4 while two courts, relying largely on the
"necessary and proper clause," have upheld the amendment. 5 There are three
possible arguments in favor of validity. (I) It might be contended that all
federal courts are of a dual nature, constitutional and legislative. While Article
III limits the jurisdiction of the for.mer, it provides no limitations which apply
to the latter. 6 It has been decided that the courts of the District of Columbia
are constitutional courts for some purposes 7 and legislative courts for others.8
The court in the principal case rightly concluded, however, that such a dual
nature could be conferred by Congress only on courts of the District and not
1

Stat. L. 73 (1789) as amended by 54 Stat. L. 143° (1940), 28 U.S.C. (1940)
.
2
Judge Evans in his dissent argued that equality of citizens accords with the
spirit of the Constitution, that it is inconsistent to deny this right to the many citizens
of the district, and that the meaning of "state" as used by the majority was too narrow.
8
"The judicial power shall extend ••• to controversies •.• between citizens of
different States."
~McGarry v. City of Bethlehem, (D.C. Pa. 1942) 45 F. Supp. 385; Behlert v.
James Foundation of New York, (D.C. N.Y. 1945) 60 F. Supp. 706, 46 CoL. L.
REV. 125 (1946), 55 YALE L. J. 600 (1946); Ostrow v. Samuel Brilliant Co., (D.C.
Mass. 1946) 66 F. Supp. 593; Feely v. Schupper Interstate Hauling System, (D.C.
Md. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 663; Wilson v. Guggenheim, (D.C. S.C. 1947) 70 F. Supp.
• 417; Willis v. Dennis, (D.C. Va. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 853.
11
Winkler v. Daniels, (D.C. Va. 1942) 43 F. Supp. 265; Glaeser v. Acacia Mutual
Life Assn., (D.C. Cal. 1944) 55 F. Supp. 925. On the desirability and constitutionality of the amendment see 29 GEo. L. J. 193 (1940).
6
Clinton v. Englebrecht, 13 Wall. (So U.S.) 434 (1872); Ex parte Bakelite
Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 49 S.Ct. 4II (1929); Katz, "Federal Legislative •courts," 43
HARV. L. REV. 894 (1930).
,
7
O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 53 S.Ct. 740 (1933), involving
diminution of a judge's salary.
8
Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 43 S.Ct. 445 (1923);
Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693, 47 S.Ct. 284 (1927).
l

§ 41 (1) (b).
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on all federal courts. ( 2) Congress, pursuant to its plenary powers over the
District, might be able to secure to its citizens the constitutional privileges of
citizens of states. The federal courts were given diversity jurisdiction in order
to alleviate fears of prejudicial treatment from state courts,9 ·and such fears
would exist in regard to citizens of the District. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has sometimes treated the District as a state,1° although generally it has
refused to do so.11 This argument was rejected in the principal case, the court
stating that the broad powers of Congress over the District did not confer power
to legislate for the whole nation so as to implement Article III. It was also
pointed out that citizens of states are. not entitled to diversity jurisdiction as a
matter of right. (3) In view of the present trend toward liberal interpretation
of the Constitution, it could reasonably be held that the phrase, "shall extend
to all cases between citizens of different states," is not exclusive and that the
outer limits of jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship are subject to legislative implementation. Those courts denying the right of citizens of the District
to diversity jurisdiction have taken it for granted, without discussion, that the
phrase is exclusive. But this line of precedent begins with Hepburn v. Ellzey,12
and it should be noted that Chief Justice Marshall stated therein that the
diversity problem is a subject for legislative and not for judicial consideration.
Where two equally valid interpretations are possible, the Court should be and
has been influenced by the interpretation adopted by Congress and utilized in
legislation. In view of the necessity for this amendment,1 3 and the natural reluctance of the Supreme Court to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional,14
it is quite possible that if appealea the decision in the principal case will be reversed and the amendment to the judicial code sustained.
Samuel N. Greenspoon
Polk's Lessee v. Wendell, 5 Wheat. (18 U.S.) 292 (1820).
the full faith and credit clause, Art. IV, sec. 1, the District
is treated as a state [Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3, 2 S.Ct. 25 (1882)]; so also for
purposes of the Commerce Clause [Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141, 9 S.Ct.
256 (1889) ]. For other cases in which the District was held to be a state and cases
where it was not so held see 29 GEo. L. J. 193 (1940).
11 For purposes of diversity the District has never been considered as a state.
Hepburn v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch (6 U.S.) 445 (1805); Cameron v. Hodges, 127 U.S.
322, 8 S.Ct. 1154 (1888); Hooe. v. Jamieson, 166 U.S. 395, 17 S.Ct. 596 (1897);
Merrill v. Atwood, (D.C. R. l; 1924) 297 F. 630; Duehay v. Acacia Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 70 App. D.C. 245, 105 F. (2d) 768 (11)39),
12
2 Cranch (6 U.S.) 445 (18,05).
13 The problem is national in scope, for just as a citizen of the District cannot
sue a citizen of another state in a federal court on grounds of diversity, neither can
the latter so sue the former. Furthermore, the Federal lnterpleader Act is inapplicable
if any of the parties involved is a citizen of the District. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lott,
(D.C. Cal. 1921) 275 F. 365. See Chafee, "The lnterpleader Act of 1936," 45
YALE L. J. 963 at 975-6 (1936); Chafee, "Federal lnterpleader Since the Act of
1936," 49 YALE L. J. 377 at 408 (1940).
14 Only one act of Congress has been declared unconstitutional since 1936. Tot
v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 63 S.Ct. 1241 (1943) declared a section of the
Federal Firearms Act unconstitutional.
9
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